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With the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the design of the climate regime beyond 2012
is now a central issue on the international negotiation agenda. A lively debate has emerged on
the form that the future regime should take to facilitate the participation of the U.S. and, in
the medium term, of major emitters among developing countries (see, e.g., Bodansky, 2004,
and Aldy et al., 2003, for recent reviews).
The ‘acceptability’ of a regime obviously depends on the global mitigation eﬀort that is
requested, and on the way this eﬀort is shared among parties. In the case of climate change,
however, this problem is compounded by the fact that decisions are made “in a sea of uncer-
tainty” (Lave, 1991): future business-as-usual (BAU) emissions are very uncertain, and so are
current—let alone future—costs of mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
No regime will eliminate uncertainty altogether. However, diﬀerent instruments (e.g., caps,
coordinated taxes or intensity targets) will allocate uncertainty very diﬀerently among the key
variables that parties focus on when negotiating future climate policies. For example, a quota
system implies with near certainty that a predetermined level of emissions is not exceeded,1
but the costs of abatement (whether measured at the margin, globally, or as a share of GDP)
are very uncertain. Conversely, a coordinated tax system would provide certainty as to the
marginal cost of abatement, but would leave ex post emissions or total costs uncertain.
The objective of this paper is to examine how diﬀerent policy instruments distribute uncer-
tainty to key variables for decision-makers, including marginal costs of abatement (the price of
carbon), total costs of abatement, and eﬀective emissions, when future GDP, BAU emissions
and marginal abatement costs are uncertain. We focus on two main instruments, absolute
quotas and intensity targets, i.e., emissions quotas indexed on economic output. This choice is
motivated by the fact that intensity targets have often been proposed as an alternative to the
continuation of the current absolute quota approach embedded in the Kyoto Protocol, notably
on the grounds that they would reduce uncertainty.
Since various forms of intensity targets have been proposed in the literature and in policy
1Barring non-compliance of course.
2circles—e.g., linear dependence of the emissions ceiling on GDP by the US administration,2
or square-root dependence by Argentina3—, we consider in this paper both a linear intensity
target, in which the quota depends linearly on GDP, and a ‘general’ intensity target with a
power-law indexing.
This article is organized as follows. After reviewing the literature (Section 2), we build
a simple but general model of the uncertainties associated with BAU emissions, future GDP
and future abatement costs (Section 3). On this basis, we derive explicit conditions under
which intensity targets reduce uncertainty on key policy variables—namely eﬀective emissions,
reduction eﬀort, marginal costs, and total costs relative to GDP—with respect to quotas
(Section 4). We then estimate ranges of values for the parameters of our model (Section
5). On this basis, we discuss how, in practice, diﬀerent instruments compare with regard to
uncertainty (Section 6). Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Two related strands of literature compare the performances of economic instruments under
uncertainty. One stems from Martin Weitzman’s (1974) paper on “Prices vs Quantities”.
Here, ‘performance’ is measured in terms of the welfare implications of each instrument, given
assumptions about the marginal costs of abatement, about the marginal beneﬁts of depollution,
and about the uncertainty surrounding these costs and beneﬁts. Pizer (1999) and Newell and
Pizer (2003) apply this approach to the problem of climate change and show that, in the short-
run at least, a tax dominates a cap approach because the slope of the marginal damage curve
is likely to be ﬂat relative to the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. Using the same
approach, Quirion (2003) ﬁnds that (linear) intensity targets are dominated by either tax or
ﬁxed quota approaches for a wide range of parameters—even though in his model there is no
uncertainty on future GDP. Quirion also points out that the result of the comparison may
2In February 2002, the U.S. government announced a plan to reduce national
greenhouse gas emissions relative to GDP by 18% by 2012 compared with 2002
(http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html).
3The Government of Argentina proposed in 1998 to adopt an intensity target such that the quota would be
a function of the square root of GDP (Barros and Grand, 2002).
3depend on whether abatement costs depend on the absolute amount of abatement, or on the
percentage of abatement relative to the baseline.
The above approach is comprehensive because the performance indicator is welfare. How-
ever, it requires detailed knowledge about the shape of the damage function, which remains
highly controversial (Ambrosi et al., 2003). In addition, it does not provide decision-makers
with information about the way diﬀerent economic instruments reduce or increase the uncer-
tainty on key decision variables, such as eﬀective (ex post) emissions, marginal abatement costs
(the price of carbon), or total costs. For this reason a second—and more recent—strand of
literature analyzes how the choice of a tax, a quota, or an intensity target impacts on the
variance of these variables. The papers in this group diﬀer in the way they model uncertainty
on input variables (future GDP, future baseline emissions, etc.), and in the policy variables
they analyze.
The idea that intensity targets would reduce uncertainty on abatement costs relative to a
quota system seems rather intuitive, and is often mentioned among the arguments in support of
the adoption of such an instrument. For example, Frankel (1999) argues that intensity targets
will, among others, “moderate the eﬀects of uncertainty”. Kim and Baumert (2002) suggest
that intensity targets could “reduce economic uncertainty”. Similarly, Strachan (in press)
ﬁnds that “using GHG intensities reduces baseline uncertainty”. The ﬁrst detailed discussion
of this argument is, to our knowledge, provided by H¨ ohne and Harnisch (2002), who compare
intensity targets and caps with regard to the amount of emissions that is abated relative to the
baseline—a proxy for abatement costs. They ﬁnd that a general intensity target dominates a
cap when the elasticity of emissions with regard to GDP is high enough, and superior to 0.5 in
the case of a linear intensity target. They note, however, that the elasticity of emissions with
regard to GDP is diﬃcult to estimate from historical data.
In a broad paper aimed at exploring the negotiation spaces provided by various policy
instruments in a multi-region model, Jotzo and Pezzey (2004) provide—in passing—the ﬁrst
analytical treatment of the performance of a general intensity target under uncertainty, and
derive an optimal calibration that depends on the stringency of the reduction target and the
4strength of the GDP-emissions nexus. In their model, the marginal abatement cost functions
are assumed certain and linear in the abatement level. The level of future business-as-usual
GDP and the emissions intensity of GDP are independent random variables. In a subsequent
paper (Jotzo and Pezzey, 2005), the authors derive an explicit expression for the variance of the
required abatement eﬀort and show that, with a set of parameters calibrated on historical time
series, a linear intensity target does not necessarily dominate a quota, but that an optimally
indexed general intensity target can always reduce the variance of marginal abatement costs
relative to a cap.
Sue Wing et al. (2006) derive an explicit analytical condition under which a general intensity
target yields a lower variance of the expected abatement eﬀort than a cap. In their model,
both BAU emissions and future GDP are random variables. They ﬁnd that a linear intensity
target is preferred to a cap unless the correlation between emissions and GDP is very low, or
the uncertainty about future GDP is much larger than the uncertainty about future emissions.
They also ﬁnd that a partial intensity target, deﬁned as a weighted average of a cap and an
intensity target, can always outperform a cap when the weights are set correctly. Testing
their results empirically, they suggest that intensity targets are clearly preferred to caps for
developing countries, while the result is more ambiguous for developed countries.
Finally, Kolstadt (2005) develops a model where both abatement costs and output are
uncertain. Within his framework, he shows that under a linear intensity target, total costs of
abatement relative to GDP are only sensitive to the uncertainty on abatement costs, and not
to the uncertainty on output. This result, however, rests on the assumption made in the paper
that abatement costs depend only on output and on emissions intensity, and not on the level
of emissions per se.
The present paper is attached to the second strand of literature. It adds to this literature in
three ways. First, it models abatement costs in a very general way, and explicitly represents the
uncertainty on abatement costs as a separate source of uncertainty. Since abating greenhouse
gas emissions has virtually never been experienced before, uncertainty on abatement costs
is very large (Hourcade et al., 2001), and plays a prominent role in the public debate on
5climate policies. From an analytical perspective, introducing uncertainty on abatement costs
allows us to address two questions raised in the literature: (i) whether uncertainty on marginal
abatement costs can indeed be proxied by the uncertainty on the reduction eﬀort, and (ii),
following Quirion (2003), whether the fact that abatement costs depend on the absolute level
of abatement, on the relative level of abatement, or on some combination thereof, matters for
the relative performances of intensity targets and quotas.
Second, our paper provides an explicit comparison of the ‘performance’ of a cap and a
general intensity target for four policy relevant variables: eﬀective (ex post) level of emissions,
abatement eﬀort, marginal cost of abatement (the price of carbon), and total costs of abate-
ment relative to GDP. This point is important because diﬀerent stakeholders will likely relate
diﬀerently to these variables. For example, environmental NGOs might be more sensitive to
the eﬀective level of emissions, industries might look carefully at the price of carbon, while
governments may be particularly interested in the total costs of abatement relative to GDP.
Finding common ground on climate policies between stakeholders thus requires to consider all
these variables.
Third, our paper is the ﬁrst to explicitly take into account the risk that BAU emissions
may be below the emissions ceiling if the target (quota or intensity) is not too strict. This
risk is not purely theoretical, as exempliﬁed by the amount of ‘hot air’ in Russia and other
transition economies under the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, a compromise with developing
countries might well involve targets that are not too far oﬀ projected BAU emissions, at least
initially. In the analytical part, we need to make the assumption that the target is stringent
enough so that this risk can be considered negligible. But in the numerical computations, we
explicitly go back to the ‘full’ model, and assess the validity of our analytical results.
63 Model Description and Key Assumptions
3.1 Deﬁnitions: Quota, Linear Intensity Target, and General Intensity Tar-
get
We assume a unique region, and compare three possible climate policy instruments for a future
‘commitment period’ of arbitrary but ﬁxed and ﬁnite length: an emissions quota, a linear
intensity target, and a general intensity target. Let E be the expected emissions of the region
in the BAU scenario, and ¯ E be the eﬀective (i.e., after abatement) emissions during the same






Q if Q ≤ E
E otherwise
(1)
Let Y be the economic output during the commitment period. An intensity target is deﬁned
as an emissions quota indexed on Y . As noted above, several indexation methods have been
proposed. In this paper, we consider two variants. First, we consider a linear intensity target
(LIT) such that, if q is the target GHG intensity (in volumes of emissions per unit of output),









In addition, we consider a general intensity target (GIT) in which the relationship between the









AG I Tw i t hm = 1 is equivalent to a linear intensity target, and a GIT with m = 0 is equivalent
to a quota.4
4Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003), and subsequently Jotzo and Pezzey (2004) and Sue Wing et al. (2006)
consider a slightly diﬀerent but essentially equivalent form of general intensity target, where the emissions target
7If future BAU emissions (E), future output (Y ), and future costs of abatement were known
with certainty, the implications of each instrument for all policy variables could be perfectly
predicted ex ante. In particular, for any given emissions target ¯ E∗, there would be a unique
level of quota (Q∗ = ¯ E∗), and a unique level of intensity target (q∗ = ¯ E∗/Y m)t h a tw o u l d
guarantee that the target is reached. In reality, future BAU emissions (E), future output (Y ),
and future costs of abatement are uncertain. But Q∗ and q∗ will be used as a benchmark
throughout the text. Precisely, when comparing intensity targets with quotas, we will use
an objective q∗ = Q∗/< Y >m, so that the two instruments would lead to the same level of
emissions in the certainty case (< · > denotes the expected value operator).
3.2 Modeling Uncertainty on GDP and Emissions
Future BAU emissions and future output are not known with certainty, and there is no agreed-
upon probability distribution for these variables. Many sets of projections are available in
the literature for both variables. But in its Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES)
(Naki´ cenovi´ c and Swart, 2000), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has
resisted to attach probabilities to these scenarios. To our knowledge, only Wigley and Raper
(2001) have constructed a probability distribution function for cumulative emissions from 1990
to 2100, by considering each of the scenarios from Naki´ cenovi´ c and Swart (2000) as equiprob-
able.
In this paper, we assume that there are probability distribution functions that represent
t h ep o s s i b l ev a l u e so fE and Y , respectively, but we do not make speciﬁc assumptions about
their functional forms. We simply assume that Y is a random variable of mean 1 (the central
forecast value), and of variance σ2
Y (the normalized mean square error). Similarly, we assume
that E is a random variable of mean 1, and of variance σ2
E.W e d e n o t e b y ι = Y − 1t h e
random perturbation of Y around its mean, and by   = E − 1 the random perturbation of E
around its mean. By construction, ι has a mean of zero and a variance of σ2
Y ,a n d  has a
mean of zero and a variance of σ2
E.
Future BAU emissions and future GDP are closely related, at least when considering CO2
has a ﬁxed part and a variable part that depends on future GDP (using our notations, ¯ E =( 1− m)Q + mqY .)
8emissions from fossil-fuel combustion—a major component of total GHG emissions—and they
usually move in the same direction. Cross-country panel data show a robust relationship be-
tween the two variables (Heil and Selden, 2001, Ravallion et al., 2000), and country-level panel
data tend to conﬁrm this ﬁnding (H¨ ohne and Harnisch, 2002, Kim and Baumert, 2002). How-
ever, since GDP and emissions time series are usually non-stationary (and often increasing),
linear regressions over panel data capture only how the underlying trends correlate over time.
They do not capture how, at each point in time, a deviation of emissions with regard to its fore-
casted level is correlated with a deviation of GDP from its forecasted level.5 In our model, it is
the latter indicator that matters for comparing absolute and intensity targets. This indicator
can be measured by the linear correlation coeﬃcient ρ.
ρ =






3.3 Modeling Uncertainty on Marginal Abatement Costs
Marginal costs of abatement are modeled in many diﬀerent ways in the literature. First, the
argument of the cost function is sometimes the percentage of BAU emissions that has been
abated (e.g., Nordhaus, 1992), and sometimes the absolute amount of emissions abated (e.g.,
Ellerman and Decaux, 1998). Second, marginal abatement costs are usually represented as an
increasing and convex function of the level of abatement, but several functional forms have been
used, including quadratic (Ellerman and Decaux, 1998), exponential (such as GTEM curves in
the CERT model by Gr¨ utter Consulting, 2003) or general power-law functions (Ghersi, 2003).
In this paper, we adopt a general representation of costs. Marginal abatement costs are
assumed to be a continuous, increasing and convex function of the abatement eﬀort R,s u c h
that marginal abatement costs are zero when the eﬀort is zero, and such that marginal costs
remain ﬁnite for any ﬁnite value of R ≥ 0. The abatement eﬀort itself is expressed as a
combination of a ‘relative’ and an ‘absolute’ eﬀort, in the form
R = Eα−1(E − ¯ E)w h e r e 0 ≤ α ≤ 1( 5 )
5High linear correlation between time series does not necessarily imply a high correlation between residuals.
9The index α characterizes the elasticity of the eﬀort with respect to baseline emissions. When
α = 0, the marginal costs depend on the amount of abatement relative to BAU emissions, i.e.
the reduction percentage. For example, consider a ﬂeet of known size of identical cars. The
marginal costs of reducing their emissions by a given percentage depend only on the unit cost
of more fuel-eﬃcient cars, and remain the same even if the emissions per car are higher or
lower than expected. Conversely, when α = 1, marginal costs depend on the absolute amount
of emissions that is abated. For example, the marginal costs of sequestering carbon through
plantations will depend on the total amount that is sequestered, rather than on the fraction of
total baseline emissions that this amount represents. Economy-wide marginal abatement costs
are likely to fall somewhere in between these two extremes.
To model a general but simple uncertainty on marginal abatement costs we postulate that
they take the form aC (R), where a is a random variable of mean <a> = 1 and of variance
σ2
C. Again, it is useful to deﬁne κ = a − 1, the random perturbation of a around its mean. κ
has mean zero and a variance of σ2
C. We assume throughout the text that the variations of a
are independent from the variations of E and Y , i.e. that κ is not correlated with   or with ι.
3.4 Additional Assumptions: Tight Regime and Small Variances
We now have the mathematical framework in place to analyze the variances of key output
variables such as the eﬀective amount of emissions or the price of carbon under a quota, a LIT,
and a GIT. But before we can proceed, two additional assumptions must be made.
First, a forthright analytical treatment is hampered by the fact that the constraint on
the eﬀective emissions of each instrument, as represented by Eqs.(1)-(3), is non-diﬀerentiable
at the point where the BAU emissions are equal to emissions target. To avoid lengthy case
diﬀerentiations (e.g., to avoid considering separately the cases E<Qand E>Qin the
analysis of a quota), we restrict ourselves to quotas Q that are suﬃciently small relative to
<E>−σE so that the probability of having E<Qis very small. Similarly, we consider
intensity targets q small enough so that the probability that E
Y <qis negligible. In other
words, our ﬁrst assumption is to restrict our analysis to ‘tight’ regimes, in which the probability
10of ‘compliance by chance’ can be neglected.
Our second assumption is that the variances of E and Y are small enough so that the
variations of output variables that depend on E and Y can be well approximated by a second-
order Taylor expansion. Note that we do not need to make the same assumption for the
variance of marginal abatement costs, since all policy variables that we analyze are linear in
the random variable a.
Based on the two assumptions above, we can write the variance σF of a generic function F


























4 Intensity vs. Quota: Analytical Approach
In this section, we successively provide analytical expressions for the variances of four policy
variables—eﬀective emissions, abatement eﬀort, marginal abatement costs and total abatement
costs relative to GDP—under a quota, a LIT and GIT. We then compare these expressions to
determine which instrument dominates the other, i.e., leads to the lowest variance—and hence
standard deviation—for the variable in question. Relying solely on variances is of course not
suﬃcient to fully characterize the underlying probability density function. For example, the
variance does not provide any indication on how symmetric or asymmetric a distribution is.
But variance and standard deviation are suﬃcient to provide some valuable insights into the
relative performance of quota, LIT and GIT vis-` a-vis uncertainty.
4.1 Eﬀective Emissions
The ﬁrst policy variable we examine are the eﬀective (i.e. after abatement) GHG emissions
¯ E. Table 1 lists the variances of ¯ E under a quota, a LIT and a GIT. These expressions are
obtained by applying Eq.(6) to Eqs.(1), (2), and (3), respectively.
The results are intuitive. Since we assume that the quota is tight enough so that the
probability of ‘compliance by chance’ is negligible, future emissions are equal to the quota
11Instrument Emissions Variance (σ2
E)
Quota 0
Linear Intensity Target q2σ2
Y
General Intensity Target q2σ2
Y m2
Table 1: Variance of eﬀective future emissions ¯ E under a quota, a linear intensity target and
a general intensity target.
with certainty and the variance is zero. Under a LIT or a GIT, on the other hand, the
emissions ceiling and thus the eﬀective emissions are uncertain because the ceiling is indexed
on future GDP, which is itself uncertain. In fact, uncertainty on future GDP (σY )i sm a p p e d
one to one onto eﬀective emissions in the LIT case (second line of Table 1). In other words,
if the standard error of GDP forecasts is 10%, the corresponding standard error for eﬀective
emissions under a LIT is also 10%. This eﬀect is attenuated under a GIT when m<1.
The comparison between instruments is straightforward: an intensity target (LIT or GIT)
always increases the uncertainty on eﬀective emissions relative to a quota.
4.2 Emissions Reduction Eﬀort
The second policy variable we examine is the general abatement eﬀort R. We compute the
variance σ2
R of R under the three instruments by applying Eq.(6) to R as deﬁned in Eq.(5),
where ¯ E is substituted by its values from Eqs.(1), (2), and (3), respectively. As discussed in
Section 3.1, we compare the variances by setting q<Y> = q = Q (i.e., in the certainty case
all three instruments would yield the same outcome).
Table 2, where for convenience we have deﬁned
qα := α + q(1 − α) , (7)
gives the expression of σ2
R under each of the three instruments. The reader will easily check
that in general all variances are positive. This is an obvious but important point that we will
ﬁnd again throughout the paper: a given instrument can control at most one output variable
(eﬀective emissions for a quota, emissions intensity of GDP for an intensity target, etc.), but












Y m2 − 2qqαρσEσY m
Table 2: Variance of general abatement eﬀort R under a quota, a linear intensity target, and
a general intensity target.
it will in general leave all the other output variables uncertain.
A second point worth noting is that all the variances depend on α, and thus on the type of
abatement eﬀort that is measured (absolute, relative, or in between the two). This translates
the fact that, for any given objective Q or q, a 10% increase in baseline emissions E leads to a
higher increase in absolute eﬀort E−Q than in relative eﬀort 1−
Q
E. As a result, variations of E
around its mean result in higher variations of R around its mean for absolute than for relative
eﬀorts. The diﬀerence between the relative and the absolute case might be quite signiﬁcant
for stringent targets. In the quota case for example, if the target is to reduce emissions by half
relative to the baseline (namely Q = q =0 .5), the standard deviation of the absolute eﬀort is
twice as high as the standard deviation of the relative eﬀort.
Third, whereas in the quota case uncertainty on R stems only from uncertainty on BAU
emissions E, two sources of uncertainty combine to make R uncertain under a LIT or a GIT:
uncertainty on Y and uncertainty on E. If these random variables are uncorrelated (ρ = 0), the
two uncertainties just add up. But if Y and E are positively correlated, the two uncertainties
partially cancel out. In fact, if Y and E are fully correlated (ρ = 1), the two uncertainties
might even completely cancel out.
The discussion above suggests that, if Y and E are suﬃciently correlated, uncertainty on
the abatement level might be lower in the intensity case than in the quota case. Precisely,
Proposition 1 The variance of the general abatement eﬀort R under a general intensity target
with q>0 and m>0 is lower than the variance of the general abatement eﬀort under a quota









13Proof: Equation 8 is obtained by setting the third line of Table 2 to be greater than the ﬁrst
and solving for ρ.
Condition (8) is a generalized version of the dominance condition obtained by Sue Wing et al.






minimum value of ρ necessary for condition (8) to be met.
For a LIT (m = 1), the condition cannot always be met, since ρminR becomes greater than
unity if the standard deviation of Y is suﬃciently larger than that of E. On the other hand,
if σE = σY , the condition becomes ρ>0.5i nt h er e l a t i v ec a s e( α =1 ) ,a n dρ>q / 2i nt h e
absolute case (α =0 ) .
With a GIT, on the other hand, regardless of the relative values of σY and σE,a n df o r
any given value of ρ and q, condition (8) can always be met by choosing an exponent m that
is small enough. In other words, by adequately choosing m, one can always ensure that the
uncertainty on the reduction eﬀort under a GIT is lower than the uncertainty on the reduction
eﬀort under a quota. And the reduction in variance can be maximized as follows:
Proposition 2 The variance of the abatement eﬀort under a GIT can be minimized by setting


















R is the zero of the derivative of σR (third line of Table 2) with regard to m.S i n c e
σR is a degree-2 polynomial function of m with a positive coeﬃcient in m2, m∗
R is unique and
corresponds to a minimum. Eq.(10) gives the value of the extremum.
Eq.(10) shows that when m is set to its optimal value m∗
R, the uncertainty on future GDP
σY is completely eliminated from the variance of the abatement eﬀort. Relative to the quota
case, the variance of the abatement eﬀort is then reduced by ρ2 percent. The reduction of
uncertainty is thus large when E and Y are well-correlated. In fact, uncertainty can even be
14eliminated completely if ρ = 1. But the reduction of uncertainty diminishes rapidly as the
degree of correlation between E and Y decreases. For example, if ρ =0 .5, using an ‘optimal’
GIT reduces the standard deviation of the abatement eﬀort relative to the quota case by 13%,
a ﬁgure that becomes a mere 2% if ρ =0 .2. In fact, when the degree of correlation between Y
and E diminishes, Eq.(9) shows that m∗
R also diminishes. In other words, the optimal general
intensity target gives less and less weight to GDP, and thus becomes closer and closer to an
absolute target.
General intensity targets, however, are more diﬃcult to apprehend and might be more
diﬃcult to negotiate. So what if a linear intensity target (m = 1) is selected instead? If the
correlation between Y and E is high, condition (8) is still likely to be met, at least as long as
σY is no more than twice as large as σE (this limit can even be relaxed when α =1 ) .W h e t h e r
the gain in uncertainty is maximal or not is determined by whether m∗
R is close to 1 or not. On
the other hand, if ρ is small, then condition (8) is likely not to be met, and the uncertainty on
the abatement eﬀort under a LIT becomes higher than under a quota. The standard deviation
of R might increase by a signiﬁcant amount, for example by 63% if α =1 ,σY =2 σE, q =0 .75
and ρ =0 .2.
4.3 Price of Carbon
The third variable we consider is the marginal cost of abatement aC(R), which can also be
thought of as the price of carbon. Applying Eq.(6) to this variable, we can write the variance of
the marginal cost of abatement σ2
MAC as a function of the variances of a and R. The expression
















where C0 := C(1 − q) (12)
and C 
0 := C (1 − q) . (13)
15The variance of the marginal cost of abatement can thus be expressed as the sum of two terms:
one related to the variance of marginal abatement costs, and the other related to the variance
of the abatement eﬀort R. Since the former does not depend on the instrument, the relative
performances of a quota, a LIT or a GIT with regard to uncertainty on the price of carbon are
the same as the relative performances of a quota, a LIT or a GIT with regard to the uncertainty
on the abatement eﬀort. The analytical condition follows from the previous section.
Proposition 3 Let R be the abatement eﬀort that the marginal cost function C(R) takes as
argument. A linear or general intensity target reduces the variance of marginal abatement costs
relative to a quota, if and only if it also reduces the variance of the abatement eﬀort R relative
to a quota, and thus if and only if condition (8) is veriﬁed.
In addition, the coeﬃcient m of a general intensity target can be set in such a way that (i)
condition (8) is met, and that (ii) the reduction of variance relative to the quota is maximized.
This optimum coincides with m∗
R from Eq.(9).
Proof: See proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
Much of the discussion regarding Eqs.(8) and (9) has already been conducted in the previous
section. We simply make two additional remarks here. First, when ρ is between 1/2 σY /σE mq
and 1/2 σY /σE m, the relative performances of quota and GIT with regard to uncertainty on
marginal abatement costs are determined by the value of α. We come back to this point in
more detail in Section 6.5.
A second remark is that the reduction of uncertainty that one can achieve by selecting
an optimal GIT (i.e., by setting m = m∗
R) is lower for marginal abatement costs than for the
abatement eﬀort. This is because the variance of marginal abatement costs is now given by
the sum of two terms, one of which is unrelated to the uncertainty on R, and thus irreducible
for all instruments.
4.4 Total Costs Relative to GDP
The fourth policy variable we examine is total costs of abatement relative to GDP (hereafter
‘relative costs’ or RC). We consider total costs relative to GDP as opposed to total costs
16because the intensity target, which is indexed on GDP, might presumably do a better job at
controlling that particular variable. Also, total costs expressed as a fraction of GDP represent
a better indicator for the eﬀective impact of climate mitigation on a country’s economy than












The term E1−α in Eq.(14) translates the fact that the additional costs of abatement caused
by an increase of the eﬀort R by dR is the marginal cost of abatement at eﬀort R, C0(R),
times the additional amount of carbon that is abated by increasing the eﬀort by dR.G i v e n
the deﬁnition of R (Eq.5), that additional amount is equal to E1−αdR.
The variance of RC is given below. The equation is written for a GIT, but the quota case
is easily obtained by setting m = 0 and the LIT case by setting m = 1. Detailed calculations





























From Eq.(15), the condition under which an intensity target reduces uncertainty on total
relative costs vis-` a-vis a quota follows.
Proposition 4 A general intensity target qY m with m>0 and q>0 leads to a lower variance












Proof: See Appendix B.
Condition (18) reveals three major diﬀerences between marginal abatement costs and total
17relative costs when it comes to uncertainty. First, unlike in the marginal abatement costs case,
it is not always possible to ﬁnd a positive value of m that will make the variance of total
relative costs under a GIT lower than under a quota. In fact, ρ needs to fulﬁll condition (19)







For example, if function C is quadratic, if we consider the relative case (α =0 ) ,a n di ft h e
target is q =0 .5, a quota always dominates a general intensity target with regard to uncertainty
on total relative costs, regardless of the value of m,a ss o o na sρ is lower than 0.25 σY /σE.
The second diﬀerence between marginal abatement costs and total relative costs vis-` a-
vis uncertainty is that ρminRC >ρ minR whenever m<2. In other words, a higher degree of
correlation between emissions and GDP is required for an intensity target to reduce uncertainty
on relative costs relative to a quota.
Third, the optimal calibration of the intensity target is generally diﬀerent:
Proposition 5 The value m∗
RC that maximizes the mitigation of uncertainty relative to the










(1 − α) − 1
 
(20)
Proof: The result is obtained by ﬁnding the minimum of Eq.(15), and solving for m.
Thus, in most cases, m∗
RC is smaller than m∗
R. This is true, in particular, when abatement
costs depend on the absolute amount of emission reductions (α =1 ) ,a n di naw i d er a n g eo f
cases— e.g. for σE ≤ σY —when α =0 . W h e nm is set to m∗
RC, the uncertainty on GDP is
completely eliminated (Eq.21) and, if the correlation ρ is very high, σ2
RC can even be reduced
to an irreducible minimum RC2
0σ2
C. However, the reduction in variance—and even more so in
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18On the other hand, choosing a linear intensity target in absence of an appreciable positive
correlation between E and Y can lead to large uncertainties on total relative costs. For instance,
for the absolute case and with a quadratic MAC function, a target reduction of q =0 .75 under
a linear intensity target with ρ = 0 yields a normalized variance, i.e. the variance divided by
the square of the deterministic value of RC, RC0, that is higher than the normalized variance
for a quota by a margin of 99 times σ2
Y .6
In sum, total relative costs are well-controlled neither by the cap nor by the intensity target.
Since the eﬀort is indexed on GDP, the intensity target might have been expected to perform
better than the quota vis-` a-vis uncertainty on relative costs. But the analysis demonstrates
that this is not the case. In fact, intensity targets perform better than quotas vis-` a-vis relative
costs less often than they do vis-` a-vis marginal abatement costs. And unlike in the marginal
abatement cost case, general intensity targets can no longer automatically be calibrated to
perform better than quotas if the correlation between E and Y is not large enough.7
5 Estimation of Model Parameters
In this section, we estimate the parameters σE, σY , σC and ρ. The commitment period we
consider here is 2013-2017, because much of the current debate focuses on the post-Kyoto
period. Ideally, one would like to estimate these parameters for individual countries because
future targets, like those in the Kyoto Protocol, are likely to be adopted by individual countries.
However, many of the GDP, emissions, and abatement cost projections on which we base our
estimates are available only for regions, and not for individual countries. As a result, the
uncertainties that we obtain with these aggregated data are likely to be smaller than the
uncertainties that we would have obtained had we had country-level data.


















7This result is not consistent with Kolstadt (2005), who shows that total relative costs are subject solely to
cost function uncertainty under an intensity target. This is because, in his model, total abatement costs depend
on emissions per unit of GDP ( ¯ E/Y). As a result, setting an intensity target, which is precisely setting a level
of emissions per unit of GDP, automatically ﬁxes total abatement costs, up to the uncertainty on the functional
form itself.
195.1 Estimation of σE, σY and ρ
Let us ﬁrst recall that E and Y are uncertain because there is no single model that would
accurately predict their value based on observables. The existing models that project future
output and future emissions are themselves based on parameters that are unobservable and
uncertain, such as the rate of autonomous technical change. In addition, there are competing
models that project future output and future emissions.
To estimate σE, σY and ρ, three main techniques are available. First, one can take sets
of projections generated by one model (e.g. the scenarios of the US Energy Information
Administration), and use the diﬀerence between the high and the low scenario as a proxy
for uncertainty. Data points in this method are often too few to allow for the estimation of
ρ. Second, one can compute the variance of projections originating from diﬀerent models, as
listed for example in the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (Naki´ cenovi´ c and Swart,
2000). The internal consistency of the scenarios is lost because diﬀerent models are involved,
but larger data sets allow for the estimation of ρ. Finally, one can compute historical forecast
errors, and take them as a proxy for the accuracy of today’s forecasts for emissions and GDP
during a post-Kyoto period.
Each approach has limitations. Using scenarios may lead to an overestimation of the
actual variance because scenarios are often built to explore a wide range of plausible futures,
and thus are not intended to be interpreted probabilistically. Historical forecast errors, on the
other hand, suﬀer from data scarcity, especially when considering long-range forecasts. In this
method therefore, linear correlation coeﬃcients can often be computed only from forecasts for
the same time horizon, but for diﬀerent countries (assuming forecasts as independent). This
approach provides a cross-country average value for ρ, but individual countries may have higher
or lower coeﬃcients depending on their particular relationships between emissions and GDP.
In this paper, we pursue all three approaches to make our estimates of the uncertainties
as robust as possible. The upper section of Table 3 shows our estimates for the normalized
standard deviation (also called coeﬃcient of variation) of GDP and BAU CO2 emissions in
2015, as inferred from the US Energy Information Administration’s (EIA, 2005) low, mid and
20World US Chn Ind Jap WEU EEU FSU LAM MENA SAFR
σY 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.11
σE 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.06
σY 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.25 0.12 0.06 0.17 0.16 0.12 0.12 0.17
σE 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.22
ρ 0.63 0.40 0.78 0.87 0.50 0.42 0.25 -0.12 -0.33 0.89 0.67
Table 3: Normalized standard deviations of the EIA (2005) scenarios for 2015 (top part), and
normalized standard deviations and liner correlation coeﬃcients of E and Y for 25 scenarios
from various sources harmonized by Lecocq and Crassous (2003) (bottom part). Data refer to
World, USA, China, India, Japan, Western Europe (WEU), Eastern Europe (EEU), Former
Soviet Union (FSU), Latin America (LAM), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Sub-
Saharan Africa (SAFR). For the EIA (2005), the latter two actually correspond to Middle East
and Africa as a whole, respectively.
high scenarios, assuming all three as equiprobable. We ﬁnd relatively small values for both σY
(between 0.06 and 0.16) and σE (between 0.03 and 0.10). Uncertainty is in general higher for
GDP than for emissions.
The bottom part of Table 3 presents estimates for the normalized standard deviation of
cumulative GDP and BAU CO2 emissions for the period 2013 to 2017, based on 25 scenarios
from multiple sources (IPCC, IIASA and US EPA) harmonized by Lecocq and Crassous (2003)
and assumed equiprobable. We ﬁnd values of σY between 0.06 for WEU and 0.25 for India,
while values for σE lie in a slightly narrower band ranging from 0.10 (US) to 0.22 (SAFR).
Uncertainty about E and Y , here, are of similar magnitude. Interestingly, parameter ρ can
take a very wide range, from a negative −0.33 for LAM to a strongly positive value of 0.89 for
MENA, with most values, however, taking on positive values above or equal to 0.4.
We also carried out a limited assessment of the accuracy of past emissions and GDP fore-
casts, similar to Lutter (2000). To this end, we compared the reference 7-year forecasts of
the 1995 issue of the International Energy Outlook (EIA, 1995) with actual data (EIA, 2005),
and likewise the 1994 8-year ahead WEO forecasts with current data (IEA, 1994, 2002, 2004).
Relative forecast errors are reported in Table 4.
As can be observed, forecast errors can be quite large (up to 67% for 8-year forecasts of East
21IEO WEO
Country CO2 GDP CO2 GDP Country
or Region 7 years 7 years 8 years 8 years or Region
World 4.4% -6.6% 3.4% -6.1% World
Industrialized C. 3.1% -1.3% 0.9% -1.4% Developing C.
Non-OECD Asia -1.6% -0.5% -0.4% -16.8% US and Canada
United States -2.6% -7.8% 2.1% 38.3% OECD Paciﬁc
Canada -1.4% -7.4% 6.5% -18.1% China
Western Europe 14.0% -1.4% 4.5% 66.9% East Asia
Japan 4.1% 19.3% -5.1% -7.3% South Asia
Former SU 30.8% 1.9% -14.5% -1.7% Middle East
Eastern Europe 26.6% -0.5% -0.2% 19.6% Latin America




Latin America -0.8% 12.7%
Table 4: Historical forecast errors for CO2 emissions and GDP of the International Energy
Outlook 1995 (EIA, 1995) and the World Energy Outlook 1994 (IEA, 1994). The WEO regions
OECD and OECD Europe could not be considered, as their composition changed signiﬁcantly
during the 1990s. Likewise, we excluded South Korea from the OECD Paciﬁc region.
Asia’s GDP).8 Secondly, while for the IEO the average absolute error for emissions is larger
than the one for GDP, the opposite is true for the WEO. Thus, as with the data in Table 3,
it cannot be asserted that either type of uncertainty (emissions or output) is necessarily lower
than the other. Third, when pooled over the diﬀerent regions listed in Table 4, forecast errors
of emissions and GDP do not show a strong correlation: the ρ corresponding to the two ‘pairs’
of forecasts from Table 4 is -0.04 and 0.31, respectively.9
Table 5 summarizes this section’s ﬁndings. Four key conclusions can be drawn. First,
σE and σY are almost always found to be below 20%. Second, there is no obvious diﬀerence
in patterns of uncertainties between developing and industrialized countries, except for an
apparently lower emissions uncertainty for industrialized countries. Third, no robust statement
8Our results are comparable to those of Lutter (2000), who ﬁnds that historical ten-year ahead emissions
forecasts for the United States are subject to a 4.2% absolute error, and that ‘simulated’ forecasts for cumulative
emissions of ﬁve-year periods are subject to errors between 5% and 25%, or even up to 37% (India), if the ﬁve-
year period starts six or more years ahead in the future.
9To avoid double-counting, these linear correlation coeﬃcients are computed by using only those individual
regions and countries that do not overlap.
22Multi-Model IEO Forecast Errors Weighted Mean
Scenarios 2005 IEO 1995 WEO 1994 1:1:1
2 : 1
2
σE 15% 6% 11% 4% 9%
All σY 14% 10% 7% 23% 13%
Countr. ρ 0.43 na -0.04 0.31 0.28
σE 17% 7% 13% 5% 11%
Develop. σY 16% 11% 6% 21% 14%
Countr. ρ 0.43 na -0.19 0.30 0.24
σE 11% 4% 6% 1% 6%
Industr. σY 8% 6% 9% 28% 11%
Countr. ρ 0.44 na 0.27 na 0.36
Table 5: Summary of parameter estimates for uncertainties σY and σE, and for the linear
correlation of forecast errors ρ. Note, however, that the latter has been derived with very few
data points. Estimates derived from forecast errors represent the average of the absolute values
of the relative forecast errors of GDP (respectively emissions) across all countries in Table 4
that are either in the developed or developing world. To avoid double-counting, aggregate
regions such as ‘World’ were excluded in this calculation. Means (last column) are computed
by taking the average of columns 2 to 5 with weights 1 : 1 : 1/2:1 /2, so as to give equal weight
to each of the three approaches.
can be made on the basis of the results above as to which uncertainty–emissions or output–is
higher, even though for the limited data considered here, the average uncertainty on future
GDP is somewhat higher than the average uncertainty on future emissions. This ﬁnding is
signiﬁcant because the ratio between the two variances plays a crucial role in the equations
obtained in Section 4. Fourth, the most diﬃcult parameter to estimate remains the correlation
of forecast errors ρ. While the evaluation of the long-term scenarios led to a remarkably large
range of values, the analysis of historical forecasts produced lower values not too far from zero.
On the aggregated level values for ρ tend to be positive, around 0.25, with a tendency to be
higher in industrialized countries than in developing countries.
5.2 Estimating Uncertainty about Marginal Abatement Costs
To estimate σC, one would need several estimates of the marginal abatement cost curve for
the period 2013-2017, all with the same functional form. Such a set, however, is not readily
available. Most of the marginal abatement cost curves currently available apply to the ﬁrst
commitment period only. In addition, available surveys of marginal abatement cost curves
23US Japan EU 15 CANZ
Relative case Exponential ﬁt 52% 70% 85% 78%
Power-law ﬁt 54% 69% 81% 60%
Absolute case Exponential ﬁt 49% 80% 79% 97%
Power-law ﬁt 51% 74% 87% 62%
Table 6: Values for the MAC uncertainty σC, as derived from Ghersi (2003). Taking for each
country/region the lower estimate leads to an overall average of 66%, and a range of 49%−81%,
valid for both the absolute and relative case.
(e.g. Metz et al., 2001, Ghersi, 2003) report only data points and not functional forms. Third,
most available studies of abatement costs focus on developed countries only.
To get some insights into σC, we use a compilation of modeling results from Ghersi (2003),
who reports two-point estimates for marginal abatement costs of 13 diﬀerent models, both in
terms of absolute and relative reductions. The marginal abatement costs are valid in 2010
for decisions made in 2000. For our study, we consider all these to represent random draws
of the true cost function, and perform a least-square ﬁt with an exponential and power-law
function. Our estimate of σC is then the normalized standard deviation of the residuals, as
reported in Table 6. Typical values are around 0.5 for the US, but signiﬁcantly higher, between
0.6 − 0.9, for other industrialized countries. Because of insuﬃcient data, we cannot provide
estimates for developing countries, but it seems reasonable—also for the very fact that no data
is available—to assume even higher values for these less researched economies.
6 Intensity vs. Quota in a Real-World Setting
We now test whether an intensity target performs better than a cap vis-` a-vis uncertainty on
key policy variables, using the analytical conditions derived in Section 4 and the empirical
values identiﬁed in Section 5.
24Country 1990 2010 Kyoto Kyoto
or Region Emissions Forecast Target Target
(btCO2)( b t C O 2) ( %o f ( %o f
1990 emissions) 2010 forecast)
USA 4.90 6.31 93% 72%
Canada 0.50 0.67 94% 71%
Western Europe 3.73 4.43 92% 77%
Japan 1.13 1.71 94% 62%
Former Soviet Union 3.77 3.20 100% 118%
Eastern Europe 1.13 1.12 92% 93%
Annex B Total 15.2 17.4 94.5% 82%
Table 7: Kyoto targets expressed as a fraction of BAU emissions in 2010, as projected in 1997.
Only CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel combustion are considered. Source: EIA (1997)
6.1 Relative Performances of Quota, LIT and GIT with Regard to Abate-
ment Eﬀort and Price of Carbon
The condition under which a GIT reduces uncertainty on the abatement eﬀort and the marginal
abatement costs relative to a quota is given by Eq.(8). The key parameters in this equation
are ρ,t h er a t i oσY /σE, q and α.
Section 5.1 provides a range of plausible values for ρ and σY /σE. In Table 5, ρ ranges
between 0.27 and 0.44, and the ratio σY /σE between 0.8 and 22 for developed countries (note
that Table 5 shows rounded values). We limit the analysis to developed countries because
there is less data on developing countries, and because the ‘tight regime’ assumption is more
likely to be valid for industrialized countries, at least for the period 2013-2017.
We ﬁrst discuss the relative performances of a quota and a linear intensity target. Fig.1
shows the area in the (log(σY /σE),ρ) plane where a quota dominates a LIT in terms of
uncertainty on abatement eﬀort and marginal abatement costs. The box represents the range
of plausible values as extracted from Table 5. In Fig.1, we set q =0 .75. As shown in Table 7,
this value is comparable to the Kyoto targets, under which the whole of Annex B committed
to limit emissions to 82% of the BAU level as it was projected in 1997. The value 0.75 is also
in the range of targets that have been proposed in the literature for the second commitment
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Figure 1: LIT vs. Quota, for Price of Carbon, q =0 .75 (Left). LIT vs. Quota, for Price of
Carbon, q =0 .5 (Right).
Fig.1 (Left) shows that over most of the plausible values for ρ and σY /σE, a quota dominates
a LIT with regard to uncertainty on eﬀort and marginal abatement costs. This result is valid
regardless of the value of α since the frontier between the areas where LIT and quota dominate
does not move much when α goes from 0 to 1.
With a more stringent target—i.e. a lower q—, the diﬀerence between the relative and the
absolute cost functions becomes more acute. The frontier in the relative case (α =0 )r e m a i n s
unchanged for any value of q because, when α =0 ,t h et e r mq/qα in Eq.(8) is equal to one. But
the frontier in the absolute case (α = 1) becomes ﬂatter and ﬂatter as q diminishes because
the term q/qα is in this case equal to q. In other words, a more stringent target increases the
‘gray area’, where the relative performances of quota and LIT depend on α (Fig.1, Right).
Contrary to a linear intensity target, a general intensity target will always dominate a
quota in terms of the uncertainty on abatement eﬀort and marginal abatement costs, as long
as m is well-chosen. However, when the ratio σY /σE is large, a small value of m is necessary.
For example, Fig.2 (Left) shows that for m =0 .3, a GIT dominates a quota for no more
than half of the box of plausible parameter values. One would have to set m =0 .03 for a GIT
to dominate over the entire range of plausible values. At this level, the GIT is very close to
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Figure 2: GIT vs. Quota, for Price of Carbon, q =0 .75, m =0 .3 (Left). LIT vs. Quota, for
Total Costs Relative to GDP, q =0 .75 (Right).
the gains in terms of the variance of the reduction eﬀort σR are rather modest. In this case,
numerical calculations show that the lowering of the standard deviation is 10% at most over
the range of plausible values listed in Table 5.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the optimal parameter m∗ that minimizes the variance
takes a very wide range of values over the set of plausible values for ρ and σY /σE:f r o m1t o
0.05 according to Eq.(9). This suggests that setting an optimal GIT cannot be done properly
without ﬁrst reducing the uncertainty on the values of ρ and σY /σE.
6.2 Relative Performances of Quota, LIT and GIT with Regard to Total
Relative Costs
The condition under which a GIT reduces uncertainty on the total costs per GDP relative to
a quota is given in Eq.(18). We test this condition using the same ranges of parameter values
as above. We use a power-law function for the marginal abatement cost function C(R)=Rγ,
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Figure 3: LIT vs. Quota, for Total Costs Relative to GDP, q =0 .5 (Left). GIT vs. Quota, for
Total Costs Relative to GDP, q =0 .75 (Right).
For exponents γ between 1 and 2, and for an eﬀort q =0 .75, C0/RC0 is thus between 8 and
12. This coeﬃcient increases rapidly when the abatement eﬀort becomes less stringent.
Fig.2 (Right) shows the area in the (log(σY /σE),ρ) plane where a quota dominates a LIT
in terms of the uncertainty on total relative costs, with q =0 .75 and γ =1 .5. Except for a
small area in the upper left corner of the box, a quota dominates a linear intensity target for
all of the plausible values for ρ and σY /σE.
More stringent targets again increase the discrepancy between the relative and the absolute
cost functions, and result in a larger area where the dominance of quota or LIT could be
determined by α. Both frontiers move, but whereas the frontier for α =1m o v e sd o w n w a r d
slightly, the frontier for α = 0 moves upward signiﬁcantly. This is because, in the relative case,
q appears in the denominator of ρminRC in Eq.(18), whereas it appears only in the numerator
in the absolute case. As a result, most of the box of plausible values remains dominated by
the quota even when q is small (Fig.3, Left).
Unlike in the case of marginal abatement costs, a general intensity target will not always
dominate a quota with regard to the uncertainty on total abatement costs relative to GDP.
Fig.3 (Right) shows the maximum area over which a GIT can dominate a quota. For q =0 .75
and γ =1 .5, this maximal area covers only about half of the range of plausible parameters
28reported in Table 5. It is important to note that in order to secure the dominance of the GIT
across the entire rectangular area, parameter m must be very small, making the GIT very
similar to an absolute quota.
Additionally, the ﬁgure indicates that the value of m needed to ensure that a GIT dominates
a quota for relative costs is always lower than the one required for the marginal abatement
costs. If we take again the previous example—σY /σE =2a n dρ =0 .3—, m needs to be lower
than 0.075 for a GIT to dominate a quota vis-` a-vis the uncertainty on total relative costs, to
be compared with 0.3 when uncertainty on marginal abatement costs is considered.
Similarly, the optimal parameter m∗ that minimizes the variance, when it exists, takes a
very wide range of values over the set of plausible values for ρ and σY /σE:f r o m1t on e a r l y
0 according to Eq.(20). Thus, we ﬁnd again that setting an optimal GIT cannot be done
properly without ﬁrst reducing the uncertainty on the values of ρ and σY /σE.
6.3 Quantifying Uncertainty
In this section, we present numerical values for the absolute level of uncertainty on output
parameters over our set of policy variables. To do so, we build three representative cases, the
characteristics of which are summarized in Table 8. The ﬁrst case (‘average’) is based on the
average of the parameters for industrialized countries reported in Table 5. By contrast, the
‘pro-intensity’ case is constructed to be the most favorable for intensity targets, i.e., with the
highest value of σE and ρ for industrialized countries from Table 5, the highest value for α and
the lowest value for σY . The ‘pro-cap’ case is the exact opposite. As in the previous section,
we use Q = q =0 .75.
Table 9 presents the normalized standard deviations for each output variable under each of
the instruments—subject to the parameter values of one of the three cases. It shows that an
intensity target (LIT or GIT) leads to non-negligible uncertainty on emissions, especially—by
construction—in the pro-cap case (0.18). The uncertainty on the abatement eﬀort is larger,
giving rise to very high uncertainties on marginal abatement costs, ranging from 68% (pro-cap
case, GIT) to more than 100% (pro-cap case, LIT). Uncertainty on total relative costs is higher
29Case 1: Average of Case 2: Case 3:
Parameter Industr. Countries Pro-Intensity Pro-Cap
σE 0.06 0.11 0.03
σY 0.11 0.06 0.18
ρ 0.36 0.44 0.27
σC 0.66 0.66 0.66
α 0.5 1 0
C0(R)R 1.5 R1.5 R1.5
Q = q 0.75 0.75 0.75
ρminR (from Eq.8) 0.80 0.22 > 1
ρminRC (from Eq.18) 0.96 0.27 > 1
m∗
R (from Eq.9) 0.22 1.02 0.05
m∗
RC (from Eq.20) 0.10 0.89 < 0
Table 8: Deﬁnition and summary of the three representative cases.
still, with normalized standard deviations always higher than 72%.
A robust pattern emerges: While as the LIT outperforms the quota by a relatively small
margin in the pro-intensity case (except of course on emissions), it leads to a medium-to-large
increase of uncertainty in the other two cases. Therefore, Table 9 suggests again that adopting
a LIT could introduce signiﬁcant uncertainty into the system.
As expected, an optimal GIT dominates all other instruments on all policy indicators save
emissions. Still, because the empirically found linear correlations ρ are not high, in particular
always below 1/2, the impact of the GIT remains limited, and its performance is on the whole
comparable to that of the cap. In addition, given that ρ and σE/σY are uncertain, it is more
realistic to assume that the GIT is calibrated for the central ‘average’ case (fourth line for each
instrument), and not with the optimal m∗ of each representative case. In that case, the GIT
no longer outperforms the cap.
6.4 Validity of the ‘Tight Regime’ Assumption
Table 9 also provides some insights on the validity of the assumptions made in Section 3.4 in
order to derive the analytical conditions, namely ‘tight regime’ and ‘limited uncertainty’ on
future emissions and GDP. In each cell of the table, the ﬁrst value is computed based on the
approximate analytical formulae derived in Section 4, while the second (between parenthesis)
30Policy Variable m Average Pro-Intensity Pro-Cap
Cap 0 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Emissions LIT 1 0.11 (0.11) 0.06 (0.06) 0.18 (0.18)
GIT(1) .5 0.05 (0.05) 0.03 (0.03) 0.09 (0.09)
Cap 0 0.21 (0.21) 0.42 (0.42) 0.10 (0.10)
Abatement LIT 1 0.32 (0.32) 0.38 (0.38) 0.53 (0.52)
Eﬀort GIT(2) m∗
R 0.19 (0.19) 0.38 (0.38) 0.10 (0.10)
GIT(3) .22 0.19 (0.19) 0.41 (0.41) 0.14 (0.14)
Cap 0 0.73 (0.76) 0.92 (1.03) 0.68 (0.68)
Marginal LIT 1 0.81 (0.89) 0.87 (0.97) 1.03 (1.19)
Costs GIT(2) m∗
R 0.72 (0.75) 0.87 (0.97) 0.68 (0.68)
GIT(3) .22 0.72 (0.75) 0.90 (1.01) 0.69 (0.72)
Cap 0 0.84 (0.95) 1.23 (1.65) 0.72 (0.79)
Relative LIT 1 1.11 (1.55) 1.16 (1.54) 1.64 (3.58)
Costs GIT(2) m∗
RC 0.83 (0.95) 1.16 (1.54) 0.72 (0.75)
GIT(3) .10 0.83 (0.95) 1.21 (1.62) 0.76 (0.89)
Table 9: Normalized standard deviation for each policy variable and instrument, for each of
the three representative cases, as derived from the analytical formulae, and computed by using
a fully general numerical model (values in parenthesis). (1) m =0 .5 for all cases. (2) GIT
calibrated using optimal values for m for each representative case. (3) GIT calibrated using
only one value for m, which corresponds to the optimal value for the ‘average’ case.
shows the actual value, as computed numerically with a bivariate normal distribution for E
and Y , fully taking into account the possibility of ‘compliance by chance’.
Table 9 conﬁrms that our assumptions lead to acceptable results for a reduction target of
−25% w.r.t. baseline emissions/intensity, at least for the three representative cases that we
have selected. In fact, there are generally only modest deviations between the analytically
approximated and rigorous numerical values, except for total relative costs, where analytical
formulae systematically underestimate real uncertainty, sometimes by a wide margin.
Since the main purpose of the paper is to examine dominance conditions, we also test the
validity of the formulae for ρminR and ρminRC, the threshold values of ρ for marginal abatement
costs and total relative costs, respectively. Table 10 shows that the approximations made at
the beginning of the paper do not lead to signiﬁcant errors on the values of these parameters:
the errors made on ρminR and ρminRC remain small compared with the range of uncertainty on
the actual value of ρ.
31Policy Target Ind.-Average Pro-Intensity Pro-Cap
Variable q analy. num. analy. num. analy. num.
0.5 0.62 0.62 0.14 0.15 > 1 > 1
Reduction 0.75 0.80 0.80 0.22 0.22 > 1 > 1
0.85 0.85 0.86 0.24 0.25 > 1 > 1
0.95 0.91 0.94 0.27 0.28 > 1 > 1
0.5 0.62 0.67 0.14 0.15 > 1 > 1
Marg.Costs 0.75 0.80 0.83 0.22 0.22 > 1 > 1
0.85 0.85 0.89 0.24 0.25 > 1 > 1
0.95 0.91 0.96 0.27 0.28 > 1 > 1
0.5 0.98 > 1 0.26 0.30 > 1 > 1
Rel.Costs 0.75 0.96 > 1 0.27 0.32 > 1 > 1
0.85 0.94 > 1 0.28 0.33 > 1 > 1
0.95 0.93 > 1 0.28 0.34 > 1 > 1
Table 10: Validity of ‘tight regime’ assumption made for analytical calculation. We confront
the analytically approximated and actual (numerical computations) threshold values for the
linear correlation ρ above which a linear intensity target dominates the cap.
6.5 Sensitivity to the MAC Function
In this ﬁnal section, we come back to the uncertainty surrounding the argument (value of α)
and the functional form of the MAC function. We have seen that there are realistic parameter
conﬁgurations in which the choice between quota and LIT depends on α. However, numerical
calculations (not shown here) suggest that the stakes are not high, since the costs of an error
in terms of additional uncertainty are relatively low.
The same applies for the curvature of the MAC function—which plays a role both through
C0/C 
0 and through RC0/C0. C0/C 
0 inﬂuences the absolute amount of uncertainty on the
marginal costs, but plays no role for the relative performances of the various instruments with
regard to price uncertainty (Section 4.3). RC0/C0, on the other hand, inﬂuences both the level
of uncertainty on total relative costs and the relative performance of cap and intensity target.
However, numerical calculations (not shown) suggest again that the ‘wrong’ choice leads to
very modest increases of uncertainty.
327C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have examined the relative performances of a quota, a linear intensity target,
and a general intensity target with regard to uncertainty on four key variables for decision-
makers: emissions, abatement eﬀort, price of carbon, and total costs of abatement relative to
GDP. Assuming that the overall constraint on carbon is tight enough, and that the uncertainties
surrounding future GDP and future business-as-usual emissions are not too large, we have
derived analytical conditions of dominance for each instrument and for each output variable.
We have derived ranges of plausible values for the uncertainties on future GDP, future BAU
emissions, and the linear correlation coeﬃcient between the two, as well as for the uncertainty
on future abatement costs. On this basis, we have examined which instrument is likely to
dominate in practice. The range of plausible values that we have derived—even for developed
countries where uncertainties appear lower—is so large that the result is ambiguous. However,
a quota seems to dominate a linear intensity target over most of the plausible area of parameter
values. A general intensity target can be constructed to dominate the quota, but in practice an
optimal calibration of the GIT would most likely lead to a target that is only weakly dependent
on GDP, and thus very similar to a quota. Therefore, the potential reduction of uncertainty
on key output variables that could be achieved remains modest.
Three concluding remarks can be made based on these results. First, we ﬁnd little evidence
to supportthe adoption of a linear intensity target over a quota, at least on uncertainty grounds.
There are clearly areas where a LIT dominates, but the overlap with the range of plausible
values for the key parameters ρ and σY /σE appears rather limited. More ambitious emission
targets improve the performances of a LIT relative to those of a cap, but very stringent targets
would be necessary—50% below BAU emissions or more—for the LIT to dominate a quota.
Such levels appear beyond the range of plausible climate agreements, at least for the second
commitment period.
Second, we conﬁrm the ﬁnding of Jotzo and Pezzey (2004) and Sue Wing et al. (2006)
that a well-calibrated general intensity target can always dominate a quota with regard to the
uncertainty on marginal abatement costs. This result, however, is no longer valid for total costs
33relative to GDP. In addition, even when an optimal GIT can theoretically be constructed, given
the wide range of plausible values for the key parameters ρ and σY /σE, a very small value for m
has to be selected to limit the risk of error, in which case the GIT becomes basically equivalent
to a cap. In other words, we do ﬁnd support for a GIT, but only when it is calibrated to be
c l o s et oaq u o t a .
The two previous remarks stem from the fact that the range of plausible values that we
have found in the paper for ρ and σY /σE is very large. Ultimately, these values translate
beliefs about how the economy of a given country or group of country will behave over the
next decade or so. If a policy-maker or an expert has a more precise view of those parameters,
his or her selection of instruments might be diﬀerent. But further analysis is necessary to
provide hard data that could support such intuitions.
Finally, let us note that the ‘tight regime’ assumption we make in this paper is not necessar-
ily valid in practice, as countries may negotiate targets that are close to their projected BAU
emissions. In this case, the possibility that BAU emissions be spontaneously below the target
can no longer be sidestepped. Examining the relative performance of various instruments when
the ‘tight regime’ assumption is relaxed is a subject for future research.
Appendix
A Approximation of Mean and Variance
Let F be a function of future BAU emissions E, of future output Y , and of the slope of the
marginal cost curve a.S i n c eE, Y ,a n da are random variables, F(E,Y,a)i sa l s oar a n d o m
variable. Assuming that the ﬂuctuations of E, Y ,a n da around their mean are small, we can
approximate F(E,Y,a)=F(<E>+ ,< Y > +ι,< a > +κ) by a Taylor expansion around
the deterministic value F(<E> ,<Y > ,<a> )=F0. Precisely,




















































where all mixed derivatives except ∂Y∂E vanish because κ is independent from both ι and  .
The expected value <F>then follows:



















where we have used the fact that, by deﬁnition, <κ 2 >= σ2
C, and so on. Finally, we obtain
the variance by rewriting Eq.(23) for the function F2:



































































which yields an expected value of







































































B Calculation of Variance of Total Relative Costs




























































































− (1 − α)
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For a quota, ∂R/∂Y = 0, and thus:
σ2















































































1 − α + C0
RC0(α + q(1 − α))
  <ρ . (38)
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